Abstract. Bottleneck routing games are a well-studied model to investigate the impact of selfish behavior in communication networks. In this model, each user selects a path in a network for routing their fixed demand. The disutility of a used only depends on the most congested link visited. We extend this model by allowing users to continuously vary the demand rate at which data is sent along the chosen path. As our main result we establish tight conditions for the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria.
Introduction
Banner and Orda [1] and independently Caragiannis et al. [4] introduced selfish bottleneck routing games as a theoretical model of resource allocation in distributed communication networks. In these games, every user of the network is associated with a non-negative demand that they want to send from their source to the respective destination and their goal is to find a path that minimizes the congestion of the most congested link. It has been argued by several researchers (cf. [5, 19, 27] ) that in the context of packet-switched communication networks, the performance of a path is closer related to the most congested link as compared to the classical sum-aggregation of costs (as in [18, 28, 33] ). In particular, in the area of designing congestion control protocols (as alternatives to the current TCP), there are several proposals (cf. [25, 34, 36, 37] ) that postulate to replace the sum-aggregation of congestion costs with the max-aggregation, primary, because the max-aggregation leads to favorable properties of protocols in terms of their stability in presence of communication delays [36, 38] .
While the bottleneck model of [1, 4] was an important step in terms of integrating routing decisions with bottleneck objectives, it lacks one fundamental tradeoff inherent in packet-switched communication networks: once a path is selected, a user increases the sending rate in case of low congestion and decreases it in case of high congestion.
In this paper, we address this tradeoff by introducing bottleneck congestion games with elastic demands, where users can continuously vary their demands.
Formally, there is a finite set of resources and a strategy of a player corresponds to a tuple consisting of a subset of resources and a demand out of a prescribed interval of feasible demands. For the case that the allowable subsets of a player correspond to the set of routes connecting the player's source node to their terminal node, we obtain unsplittable bottleneck routings as in [1, 4] . Resources have player-specific cost functions that are non-decreasing and strictly convex. Every user is associated with a non-decreasing strictly concave utility function measuring the received utility from sending at a certain demand rate. The goal of a user is to select both a subset of resources and a demand rate that maximizes the utility (from the demand rate) minus the congestion cost on the most expensive resource contained in the chosen resource set. Our model thus integrates as a special case (i) single-path routing (which is up to date standard as splitting packets over several routes leads to different packet inter-arrival times and synchronization problems) and (ii) congestion control via data rate adaption based on the maximum congestion experienced.
Our Results
As our main result we derive conditions for the cost functions so that the resulting bottleneck congestion game with elastic demands admits a pure Nash equilibrium (PNE). Our condition requires that for every player the player-specific resource cost functions are non-decreasing, strictly convex and equal up to resource specific shifts in their argument. While monotonicity and convexity are natural conditions, the last assumption seems limiting. We can show, however, that without this assumption there are examples without any PNE, even for the special case that all resource cost functions are not player-specific.
3 Moreover, we demonstrate that the our conditions on the resource cost functions are still general enough to model M/M/1 functions that are frequently used to model delays in communication networks.
We prove the existence result by devising an algorithm that computes a PNE. The main idea of the algorithm is as follows. Assume we are given a strategy profile with a fixed resource set (e.g., a path in the network setting) for every player. We consider a series of decoupled games on each resource contained in the set separately. Then, we compute an equilibrium for the decoupled game of each resource and call the resulting vector of demands a distributed equilibrium. Note that a distributed equilibrium is not a feasible strategy profile of the original game as a player may now have different demands on different resources along the chosen path. We then devise an algorithm that turns a distributed equilibrium into a feasible strategy profile with the property that no player can improve by changing the demand only. We call such a profile a demand equilibrium. Our main algorithm then iteratively (i) computes demand equilibria, and (ii) if an equilibrium is not reached yet, lets single players play a better and best response. We provide a lexicographical potential for this special dynamic and thus prove that the algorithm terminates.
In the interest of space, we defer most of the proofs to the full version of this paper.
Related Work
Bottleneck Routing. In bottleneck routing games with fixed demands strong equilibria have been shown to exist [14] , even for more general classes of cost functions where the cost of a resource may depend on the sets of its users rather than the aggregated demand. The complexity of computing PNE and strong equilibria in these games was further investigated in [10] . For further works in this area considering the price of anarchy of PNE as well as the worst-case quality of strong equilibria we refer to [2, 3, 5, 7, 16, 17] .
In an independent line of research, Kukushkin [24] studied generalizations of the congestion game model of Rosentahl [28] in which the sum-aggregation is replaced by an arbitrary aggregation function. He proved that among the aggregation functions for which a cost increase on one resource always leads to an increased private cost for all of its users, sum-aggregation is the only aggregation function that guarantees the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium. Games with maximum-aggregation were also studied by Kukushkin [23] , where he proved that any bottleneck congestion game with non-decreasing cost admits a strong equilibrium. Further related is our previous work [13] , where we establish the existence of an equilibrium for a class of aggregative location games. This existence result implies the existence of a pure Nash equilibria for the present model assuming that the allowable sets of resource of players contain singletons only.
Combined Routing and Congestion Control. Integrated routing and congestion control has been studied in [9, 20, 21, 31, 32] , where the existence of an equilibrium is proved by showing that it corresponds to an optimal solution of an associated convex utility maximization problem. These models, however, require that every user possibly splits the flow among up to an exponential number of paths. This issue has been addressed in [6, 26] , where controllable route splitting at routers is assumed which can effectively limit the resulting number of used routes. For all the above models, however, the end-to-end applications may suffer in service quality due to packet jitter caused by different path delays. Partly because of this issue, the standard TCP/IP protocol suite still uses single path routing. Also in contrast to our model, all these models assume that congestion feedback is aggregated via the sum instead of the max operator.
Yang et al. [35] introduced the so-called MAXBAR-games where users select a single path and adapt their sending rate. In their model, edges have fixed capacities and users (synchronously) increase their rate until the capacity of an edge is reached. After such an event all rates of users using this tight edge are fixed. Yang et al. showed that these games possess a PNE, and that the price of anarchy of pure Nash equilibria is n, where n is the number of players. Harks et al. [11] generalized the model of Yang et al. by allowing for more general ways of increasing the rates of users. They derived the existence of strong equilibria for this more general model.
Harks and Klimm [12] introduced congestion games with variable demands that coincide with the present model except that the traditional sum-aggregation of costs is used. They showed that only affine and certain exponential cost functions lead to the existence of PNE. These results are in contrast to the results obtained in this paper because here we prove that general player-specific convex cost functions lead to PNE as long as they are equal up to resource specific shifts in their argument.
The Model
Congestion Model. The games considered in this paper are based on a congestion model defined as follows. Let R = {1, . . . , m} be a nonempty and finite set of m ∈ N resources, and let N = {1, . . . , n} be a nonempty and finite set of n ∈ N players. For every i ∈ N let X i ⊂ 2 R \ {∅} be a nonempty set of nonempty subsets of resources available to player i. Whenever a player i uses the resources in x i ∈ X i , we say that the resources in x i are allocated to player i; we also call x i an allocation of player i and we denote by x = (x i ) i∈N the overall allocation vector. For every player i and every resource r ∈ R we are given a player-specific cost function c i,r : R ≥0 → R ≥0 that maps the aggregated demand on r to a cost value for player i. We call the tuple M = N, R, (X i ) i∈N , (c i,r ) r∈R,i∈N a congestion model.
Bottleneck Congestion Games with Elastic Demands.
In a bottleneck congestion game with elastic demands, we are given a congestion model M and, for every player i ∈ N , a utility function
is the interval of feasible demands of player i. We denote by d = (d i ) i∈N the overall demand vector. A bottleneck congestion game with elastic demands is the maximization game G = (N, S, π)
Here, ℓ r (s) = ℓ r (x, d) = j∈N :r∈xj d j is the load (or aggregated demand ) of resource r under strategy profile s = (x, d).
We impose the following assumptions on the utility and cost functions, respectively.
Assumption 1 For every player
is non-decreasing, differentiable and strictly concave.
Strict concavity of the utility function in the demand is justified by applicationspecific characteristics such as the rate-control algorithm used in common congestion control protocols, see [18, 30] .
Assumption 2 For every resource r ∈ R and player i ∈ N , the cost function c i,r : R ≥0 → R ≥0 is non-decreasing, differentiable and strictly convex.
Note that in many applications the considered cost functions are strictly convex, e.g., the polynomial delay functions considered in transportation networks (cf. [29] ) and M/M/1 functions modeling queuing delays in telecommunication networks (cf. [31] ).
Assumption 3 There are functions c i : R ≥0 → R ≥0 for all i ∈ N and offsets υ r ∈ R ≥0 for all r ∈ R such that for every i ∈ N and r ∈ R c i,r (t) = c i (t + υ r ) for all t ≥ 0.
The above assumption implies that for every player, the maximum load (including offsets) experienced on the chosen subset of resources determines the bottleneck. While this assumption is certainly restrictive, we show in the full version of this paper that without it, there are games without a PNE. We remark that the important class of M/M/1 delay functions that are frequently used to model queueing delays (cf. [22, 8] and references therein) still satisfy Assumption 3. Proof. Let z max := max r∈R {z r }. For resource-specific offsets defined as υ r := z max − z r ≥ 0 for all r ∈ R and player-specific functions c i (t) := t i /(z max − t), we then obtain
for all r ∈ R and i ∈ N . ⊓ ⊔ For a strategy profile s = (x, d) let
denote the maximal load or bottleneck that player i experiences and denote by b
) the set of resources where player i experiences their bottleneck, i.e.,
A Characterization of Pure Nash Equilibria
We now present a complete characterization of pure Nash equilibria in bottleneck congestion games. Our characterization relies on the notion of a demand equilibrium which we define as a strategy profile with the property that no player can increase their payoff by unilaterally changing her demand only.
Definition 5 (Demand Equilibrium
We obtain the following immediate necessary condition for a PNE.
Lemma 6. Every PNE of a bottleneck congestion game with elastic demands is a demand equilibrium.
Before we proceed deriving optimality conditions for demand equilibria we demonstrate that in general (i.e., without Assumption 3), the payoff functions π i (x, d), i ∈ N are not necessarily differentiable with respect to d i .
Example 7. Consider a game with one player i with utility function U i and two resources r 1 , r 2 equipped with two affine cost functions c r1 (t) = 1 + t and c r2 (t) = 2t for all t ∈ R ≥0 . The payoff to player i with resource allocation x = x i = {r 1 , r 2 } is not differentiable with respect to d i at d i = 1. To see this, first note that c r1 (t) ≥ c r2 (t) for all t ≤ 1 and c r1 (t) ≤ c r2 (t) for all t ≥ 1. We then obtain
For cost functions that satisfy Assumption 3, however, we obtain the following necessary condition for demand equilibria.
Lemma 8. Let (x, d) be a demand equilibrium. Then, for all i ∈ N with σ i < τ i the following two conditions are satisfied:
Sensitivity Analysis of Demand Equilibria
Let s = (x, d) be a demand equilibrium and let ℓ −i r (s) := j∈N \{i} d j denote the residual load of player i on some r ∈ R. Then, using that s is a demand equilibrium, we obtain
In the following, we investigate how a demand equilibrium is adapted if the residual load on a resource changes. This will be important later on in order to understand the effect of switching sets of resource when changing the strategy from some x i ∈ X i to some y i ∈ X i . Given some fixed residual load α on a resource r, we analyze how the best-response demand function
depends on α. As for all α ∈ R ≥0 the function f (y) := U i (y) − c i (α + y) is strictly concave in y and lim y→∞ f (y) = −∞, the above optimization problem has a unique solution, hence, the best response demand function is well defined.
Lemma 9 (Individual Best Response Demands). Let α, β ∈ R ≥0 . Then, the following two conditions are equivalent:
We are now in position to derive a complete characterization of PNE. t (s) + υ t for all i ∈ N and y i ∈ X i .
Proof. "⇒": By Lemma 6 we get that s must be a demand equilibrium. For the second statement, assume there is a player i and y i ∈ X i with ℓ −i r (s) + υ r > max t∈yi ℓ −i t (s)+ υ t . This implies that player i can increase their payoff by simply deviating from strategy
where the first inequality holds due to ℓ −i r (s) + υ r ≤ max t∈yi ℓ t (s) + υ t and c i is non-decreasing. The second inequality holds because s is a demand equilibrium and therefore d i is player i's best response demand.
⊓ ⊔
Computing Demand Equilibria
Theorem 10 shows that for computing a PNE we must be able to compute a demand equilibrium. In this section, we describe an algorithm that does exactly this. For the algorithm we first need the notion of distributed equilibria defined below.
Distributed Equilibria
Let G = (N, S, π) be a bottleneck congestion game, M ⊆ N , and let r be a resource. We define the restriction of G on M and r, written G| (M,r) as the bottleneck congestion game
Definition 11 (Distributed Equilibrium). Let G be a bottleneck congestion game with elastic demands. For x ∈ X define N r (x) := {i ∈ N : r ∈ x i }. A non-negative vectord = (d i,r ) r∈R,i∈Nr(x) is called a distributed equilibrium, if for all r ∈ R the strategy profile (d i,r ) i∈Nr (x) is a PNE of G| (Nr(x),r) .
Note that every restricted game G| (Nr(x),r) is a concave game on a compact action space, thus, by Kakutani's fixed point theorem [15] the existence of a distributed equilibrium is guaranteed. Moreover, as we will show below, these equilibria are in fact unique. For a distributed equilibriumd with respect to x ∈ X, we definel r (x,d) := i∈Nr(x)d i,r . We first need the following lemma.
Lemma 12. Let x, x
′ ∈ X and letd andd ′ be two respective distributed equilibrium demands. Then,d i,r ≤d
Using this lemma, we obtain the following immediate corollary.
Corollary 13 (Uniqueness)
. Let x, x ′ ∈ X and letd andd ′ be two respective distributed equilibrium demands. Then, the following two statements hold:
We now derive a corollary that will be useful later on. It states the intuitive fact that when the feasible demand set of a player is fixed to a value not larger than the demand for resource r is a particular distributed equilibrium, then the total demand for r in after recomputing a distributed equilibrium may not increase.
Corollary 14 (Demand Restriction)
. Let x ∈ X and letd be a corresponding distributed equilibrium demand. For i ∈ N and r ∈ x i , define a new game G ′ that differs only in the fact that τ
Algorithm 1: Computation of a demand equilibrium
Input: Bottleneck congestion game with elastic demands G and x ∈ X Output:
choose an index-minimal r ∈ arg max r∈R ′ i∈Nr (x)d i,r + υr ; 5 dj ←dj,r; σj ← dj; τj ← dj for all j ∈ N ′ ∩ Nr(x);
An Algorithm for Computing Demand Equilibria
We are now ready to propose an algorithm that takes as input an allocation x ∈ X and computes a corresponding demand equilibrium (x, d) ∈ S. The algorithm first computes a distributed equilibrium (x,d). Then, a resource r with maximum load is chosen and the demand of each player i ∈ N r (x) is fixed to the demandd i,r . For the remaining players we recompute a distributed equilibrium and reiterate. The formal description is given in Algorithm 1.
We shall show that Algorithm 1 indeed outputs a demand equilibrium.
Theorem 15. Algorithm 1 computes a demand equilibrium.
Proof. The demand vector d computed by Algorithm 1 satisfies
all i ∈ N and is, thus, feasible. We proceed to show that (x, d) is a demand equilibrium.
To this end, let us assume that R = {1, . . . , m}. Further, it is without loss of generality to assume that the resources R are ordered such that for each k ∈ {1, . . . , m} in the k-th iteration of the algorithm resource k is chosen in line 4.
We proceed to show that
To see this, let k ∈ {1, . . . , m − 1} be arbitrary. For an iteration counter j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, we denote byd j the distributed equilibrium demand computed in line 3 of the algorithm. As we choose in each iteration j a resource that maximizesl r (x,d j )+ υ r , we obtain in particularl
for all i ∈ N with {k, k + 1} ⊆ x i . Corollary 14 gives the claimed result.
We derive that for each player i the bottleneck is attained at the resource r ∈ x i with minimal index. As the algorithm fixes the demand of each player i the first time one of the resources used by player i is considered (line 5), the demand vector d computed by Algorithm 1 is a demand equilibrium.
⊓ ⊔ Remark 16. Note that for a given input G and x, Algorithm 1 computes the same demand equilibrium (x, d). This follows since the distributed demand equilibria are unique (see Corollary 13) and there is a fixed tie-breaking rule employed that determines the order in which resources are fixed (as specified in line 3).
Algorithm 2: Computation of a PNE
Input: Bottleneck congestion game with elastic demands G Output: 
An Algorithm for Computing PNE
We present an algorithm that computes a PNE. The algorithm starts with an arbitrary strategy profile and computes a demand equilibrium. Then, whenever there is a player that can improve, we let this player deviate (by Theorem 10 this implies that the player's resource set changes) and recompute a demand equilibrium. The technically involved part is to show that the algorithm terminates.
In this section, we show the following theorem.
Theorem 17. Algorithm 2 computes terminates and computes a PNE.
Before we prove the above theorem, we derive several properties of intermediate strategy profiles during the execution of the algorithm.
Analysis of the Algorithm
For a strategy profile s = (x, d), we consider b i (s) = max r∈xi {ℓ r (s) + υ r } and b(s) = (b i (s)) i∈N . We shall prove that b(s) strictly decreases with respect to the sorted lexicographical order ≺ lex that is defined as follows: For two vectors u, v ∈ R n ≥0 we say that u is sorted lexicographically smaller than v, written u ≺ lex v, if there is an index k ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that u π(i) = v ψ(i) for all i < k and u π(k) < v ψ(k) where π and ψ are permutations that sort u and v nonincreasingly, i.e.,
We now derive a crucial lemma that relates two consecutive demand equilibria s ands (as computed in Phase I). 
) the demand equilibrium that is computed in Algorithm 1 in Phase I in the following iteration. Then, b(s) ≺ b(s).
Proof. We first derive the following statements relating b(s) with b(s):
We start proving (i). Let r 1 ∈ b
. We will first show that ℓ r1 (s)+ υ r1 > ℓ r2 (s ′ )+ υ r2 holds. Note that by using s 
We now claim that ℓ r2 (s 
thus, for all l ∈ {1, . . . , k} we have r l / ∈ x ′ i and, hence, N r l (x ′ ) ⊆ N r l (x). If r l / ∈ x i for all l ∈ {1, . . . , k}, then, we have ℓ r l (s) + υ r l = ℓ r l (s) + υ r l for all l ∈ {1, . . . , k}, which contradicts b j (s) > b j (s). Thus, let g be the smallest index such that r g ∈ x i . This implies b i (s) ≥ ℓ r g (s)+ υ r g . Note that by (1) we get b j (s) ≤ ℓ r g (s)+ υ r g . Using N r g (x ′ ) ⊂ N r g (x) we further obtain by using Corollary 13 ℓ r g (s) + υ r g ≥ ℓ r g (s) + υ r g . This is, however, a contradiction to ⊓ ⊔
We are now in position to prove Theorem 17.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 17)
. Lemma 18 shows that the vector b(s) strictly lexicographically decreases during the execution of Algorithm 2. Thus, since the demand equilibrium computed by Algorithm 1 in Phase I of Algorithm 2 is always the same, no vector x ∈ X is visited twice during the execution of Algorithm 2, and, hence, the algorithm terminates (as X contains only finitely many elements). ⊓ ⊔
